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THE WILSONIAN DILEMMA 
Mark David Hall 
East Central University 
This essay explores James Wilson’s approach to the so-called “Madisonian 
Dilemma. ” I first explain how the tension between majority rule and 
minority rights was more extreme for Wilson than for most founders. I then 
show how his view of human nature and moral epistemology allowed him 
to resolve the dilemma. Although Wilson’s solution may be less realistic 
than Madison’s, it is still worthy of serious consideration because of its 
influence on the creation of America’s constitutional system. 
J a m e s  Wilson (1742-1 798) is perhaps the most underrated founder. 
One of only six men to sign both the Declaration and the Constitution, his 
influence on the latter was second only to that of James Madison. Wilson 
also played a central role in the ratifying debates, and he was the moving 
force behind the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. Furthermore, as a law 
professor and Supreme Court Justice, he produced some of the period’s 
most profound commentary on the Constitution and American law. 
In spite of his importance, Wilson’s political theory has been relatively 
ignored by the scholarly community. This article contributes toward reme- 
dying this gap in the literature by addressing Wilson’s approach to a central 
theme in American political theory: the conflict between majority rule and 
the protection of minority rights. Often described as the “Madisonian 
Dilemma,” the tension between these two ends was actually more extreme 
for Wilson than Madison. Yet, although Wilson came to a significantly 
different solution to the problem, his approach to the dilemma has never 
been systematically examined and analyzed. This may be because his 
solution is less realistic than Madison’s, but even so it should be studied 
because of its influence on the creation of the American republic.’ 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
James Wilson did not have a theory of minority rights per se. Instead, 
he believed that all individuals possess natural rights, whether they are in 
the minority or the majority. These rights are based upon an explicitly 
theistic theory of natural law. He taught that “our Creator has a supreme 
right to prescribe a law for our conduct, and that we are under the most 
perfect obligation to obey that law, are truths established on the clearest and 
Southeastern Political Review 0 Volume 25 No. 4 0 December 1997 
642 Southeastern Political Review Vul. 25 Nu. 4 
most solid principles” (McCloskey 1967, 126). But as clear as these truths 
were to Wilson, and in spite of his clear presentation of them in his law 
lectures, many contemporary scholars have ignored this aspect of his 
thought. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly outline his theory of natural 
rights.2 
Wilson followed Richard Hooker, who himself borrowed from St. 
Thomas Aquinas, when he divided law into several categories. First Wilson 
proposed that all law should be divided into two main classes, divine and 
human. The former may be divided into four species: (1) eternal law, (2) 
celestial law, (3) physical laws, and (4) “that law which God has made for 
man in his present state” (McCloskey 1967, 124). The latter, Wilson 
explained, is called the “law of nature,” if it is addressed to men, or “the 
law of nations,” if it is addressed to political societies (McCloskey 1967, 
123). 
The second great class of law is known as “human law.” This law 
“must rest its authority, ultimately, upon the authority ofthat law, which is 
divine” (McCloskey 1967, 123). Wilson taught that it is divided into two 
species: “1. That which a political society makes for itself. This is 
municipal law. 2. That which two or more political societies make for 
themselves. This is the voluntary law of nations” (McCloskey 1967, 125). 
Wilson was clear that both kinds of law must correspond to natural law, or 
they are void. It is from this principle that he derived his theory of natural 
rights. 
Wilson did not make the sort of distinctions between the terms “natural 
law,” “natural right,” and “natural rights” that some philosophers make! 
Instead, he thought that natural rights are simply what individuals are 
“entitled” to by “nature and nature’s law” (McCloskey 1967, 589,722). 
To claim a natural right is simply another way of appealing to natural law. 
For instance, if natural law dictates that all persons must be free, it follows 
that individuals have a natural right to be free. It is therefore necessary for 
positive law to respect the natural right to freedom. 
Wilson’s most extensive discussion of natural rights is seen in his law 
lecture entitled “Of the Natural Rights of Individuals.” He began by 
criticizing Edmund Burke and Sir William Blackstone because he thought 
that they taught that the origin of natural rights is merely human. Instead, 
Wilson argued that men and women possess rights based on natural law 
regardless of where or when they live. Central among these are the rights 
of individuals to safety, property, character, and liberty. He had a fairly 
expansive understanding of the latter concept, arguing that it includes 
freedom ofreligion and the right to “think, to speak, to write, and to publish 
freely” (McCloskey 1967, 579).5 
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Wilson believed that individuals possess rights other than those men- 
tioned above. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this essay, to examine 
these rights in detail. What is important is that governments must protect 
rights. In fact, Wilson argued that governments “should be formed to 
secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; and 
every government, which was not his view, and its principal object, is not 
a government ofthe legitimate kind” (McCloskey 1967,592). All members 
of society should be equally protected by these laws, whether they are in a 
minority or a majority, because law is founded upon moral principles, not 
popular opinion. Foreshadowing John Stuart Mill’s opposition to majority 
tyranny, Wilson wrote that: 
On one side, indeed, there stands a single individual: on the other 
side, perhaps, there stand millions: but right is weighed by principle; 
it is not estimated by numbers (McCloskey 1967, 577. Compare 
with Mill 1989, 20). 
No other conclusion is warranted, Wilson taught, since natural law was 
created by God and therefore provides an absolute, immutable, and univer- 
sal moral standard. The individual rights of men and women are founded 
on this law. Human laws must be based on this higher law if they are to be 
valid. Any human law that does not meet this criterion is void. Wilson’s 
view of natural rights must be considered a “strong” theory because he held 
that everyone’s rights, even those of a small minority, must always be 
protected. How this may be done, and how natural lawhights may be known 
is discussed below. First, however, it is necessary to examine the other horn 
of the Wilsonian Dilemma. 
WILSON THE DEMOCRAT 
Because Wilson believed so strongly that individual rights must be 
protected, one might assume he would join many of the other founders in 
their distrust of majority rule. Indeed, James Madison suggested in a letter 
to Thomas Jefferson that 
the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from 
acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from 
acts in which the Government is mere instrument of the major 
number of its constituents (Meyers 1973, 206). 
In addition to theoretical problems he might have had, Wilson had also been 
a victim of mob violence, the ultimate tyranny ofthe majority (Smith 1956). 
It is somewhat surprising, then, that he was one of the most consistent and 
ardent promoters of democracy in late eighteenth century America. Wilson 
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held that governments must be based on consent if they are to be legitimate. 
Further, he vigorously advocated institutions of government that maximize 
citizen participation in public affairs. Although one commentator’s de- 
scription of him as an advocate of “unrestrained majoritarianism” is an 
exaggeration, he was clearly one of the foremost democrats in the founding 
period (Rossum 1976, 1 16). 
Central to Wilson’s theory of government is the importance of popular 
consent. He noted “[tlhat the supreme power ... should be vested in the 
people, is in myjudgement the great panaceaof human politics. It is apower 
paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite in 
its extent” (McMaster and Stone 1970, 230). Wilson taught that popular 
consent could be transferred to a legitimate government through the device 
of a social contract. He followed Locke, however, in arguing that the people 
always retain their sovereignty, they cannot contract it away (McMaster and 
Stone 1970; Locke 1988). While Americans might place a system of 
government over themselves, they are always sovereign. They are the 
foundation upon which government is dependent. Their consent, he pro- 
posed, is the “sole legitimate principle of obedience to human laws” 
(McCloskey 1967, 180).6 
Wilson’s theory of popular sovereignty led him to have a more progres- 
sive view of suffrage than most ofhis contemporaries. Believing that every 
independent person should be able to vote, he taught that 
[tlhis darling privilege of freeman [suffrage] should certainly be 
extended as far as considerations of safety and order will possibly 
admit. The correct theory and the true principles of liberty require, 
that every citizen, whose circumstances do not render him necessar- 
ily dependent on the will ofanother, should possess avote in electing 
those, by whose conduct his property, his reputation, his liberty, and 
his life, may be all most materially affected (McCloskey 1967,406). 
For Wilson, only those individuals free from the direct influence of others 
should vote. Through the use of this standard he concluded that suffrage 
should be given to “every freeman.” Following this principle, he joined 
his colleagues in concluding that children should not vote because they are 
under the direct control of their parents. Similarly, women, presumed to be 
under the control of their husbands, and slaves, clearly controlled by their 
masters, had no right to suffrage (McCloskey 1 967).7 
Many of Wilson’s contemporaries also applied this logic to males who 
did not own land. Gouverneur Morris, for instance, proposed that there be 
a free-hold qualification for voting in national elections because landless 
males would be easily controlled by the rich. Although this provision was 
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supported by many founders, including James Madison, Wilson rejected it 
as unnecessary and dangerous. The Convention eventually compromised 
by allowing states to decide their own qualifications (Farrand [ 191 11 1966). 
Many of them eventually chose to liberalize their voting laws to meet 
Wilson’s more democratic standards. In Pennsylvania, he personally led 
the fight in the convention of 1789-90 which resulted in an “almost 
negligible tax qualification for voting” (McCloskey 1967, 5). 
Wilson consistently advocated a liberal view of suffrage. In this manner 
he attempted to broaden the foundation of government. To him, govern- 
ment is like a pyramid, with a constituent people as its base. He explained 
that 
[tlthe pyramid of government-and a republican government may 
well receive that beautiful and solid form-should be raised to a 
dignified altitude: but its foundation must, of consequence, be 
broad, and strong, and deep. The authority, the interests, and the 
affections of the people at large are the only foundation, on which a 
superstructure, proposed to be at once durable and magnificent, can 
be rationally erected (McCloskey 1967, 403). 
Thus the people are the foundation upon which a constitution can be based. 
The government is then created by this document, which outlines the powers 
of the various institutions. Theoretically institutions could take a multitude 
of forms, so long as the people consent to them. To Wilson, however, the 
best government is that which maximizes the participation of the people. 
Accordingly, he was the most consistent proponent of democracy at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.* 
From the start of the Convention, Wilson contended that every institu- 
tion should be as firmly based in the direct consent ofthe people as possible. 
For instance, he advocated the direct popular election of both repre- 
sentatives and senators. In addition, he argued that since people, not states, 
are the basis of representation, members of both houses ought to be elected 
from proportionally sized districts to prevent unfair influence by a minority 
(Farrand 1966). He explained that 
all elections ought be to equal. Elections are equal, when a given 
number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many repre- 
sentatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other 
part of the state. In this manner, the proportion of representatives 
and of the constituents will remain invariably the same (McCloskey 
1967,406). 
For the same reason Wilson proposed the direct, popular election of the 
exec~ t ive .~  In doing so he realized that he was at odds with much of the 
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conventional wisdom of his day. He admitted that his proposal might be 
considered “chimerical,” but he noted that “at least in theory he was for an 
election by the people” (Farrand 1966, I:68). When few delegates sup- 
ported this proposal, Wilsonjoined with others to contain his loss by helping 
to form the electoral college. This vehicle allowed the states to appoint 
electors in any manner they saw fit, which at least left open the possibility 
that states could choose them by popular vote (Farrand 1966; McCloskey 
1967). He also fought for a variety of small details that illustrate his 
profound commitment to democracy.I0 
Skeptics have claimed that Wilson supported majority rule simply for 
rhetorical reasons, or because his state would benefit from representation 
on the basis of population (Jenson 1956; Sargent 1988). Such analysis 
ignores Wilson’s advocacy of democracy throughout his lifetime. For 
instance, Wilson, as the undisputed leader of Pennsylvania’s constitutional 
convention of 1789-90, deserves credit for winning the direct, popular 
election of the governor, representatives, and senators (Seed 1978; 
McCloskey 1967). He also faithfully supported the principle of one-man- 
one-vote, arguing that it should be applied to each branch of the legislature. 
Finally, he again showed himselfto be a consistent democrat even regarding 
the details of government when he opposed any form of term limits and 
supported a provision for compulsory voting, “if elections are not properly 
attended” (Seed 1978,137). 
Wilson was one of this country’s greatest democrats in the founding era. 
On many issues he was far ahead of his time. For example, Wilson’s ideal 
of a popularly elected senate was not constitutionally protected until the 
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913. Similarly, his principle of 
one-man-one-vote was not guaranteed until the 1964 Supreme Court case 
Wesberty v. Sunders. And to this day, America has still not adopted 
Wilson’s proposal that the people directly elect the president. It thus is fair 
to conclude with Charles Page Smith that Wilson 
believed in the political capacity of the people, and was anxious to 
have them exercise political power directly rather than filtered 
through various political mediums designed to sift out “ignorant 
passions.” Far more than most of his colleagues Wilson stood in the 
main current of what was to become the American democratic 
tradition (1956, 238). 
MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE 
The “Wilsonian dilemma” arises because of Wilson’s support for two 
good but seemingly incompatible ends. On the one hand was his belief that 
natural rights must be protected by the government. On the other was his 
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insistence that governments must be based on the direct consent of the 
people. For many thinkers these two goals are mutually exclusive. Wilson, 
however, believed that majority rule and the creation of human law in 
agreement with natural law (thereby not violating natural rights) went 
hand-in-hand. He reached this conclusion because of his moral epistemol- 
ogy and view of human nature. 
Wilson contended that the “will of God,” in moral matters, is discovered 
through “our conscience, by our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures” 
(McCloskey 1967, 133). If there seems to be disagreement among these, 
he proposed that “[wlhere the latter give instructions, those instructions are 
supereminently authentick” (McCloskey 1967, 144). Revelation given to 
men and women in the Bible contains “moral precepts” that “form a part 
of the law of nature” (McCloskey 1967, 143). But these principles deal 
primarily with the relationship between God and individuals. Because the 
Scriptures do not give specific instructions on many matters, 
whosoever expects to find, in them particular directions for every 
moral doubt which arises, expects more than he will find. They 
generally presuppose a knowledge of the principles of morality; and 
are employed not so much in teaching new rules on this subject, as 
in enforcing the practice of those already known, by a greater 
certainty, and by new sanctions (McCloskey 1967,144). 
Thus, while Wilson respected and deferred to the Bible, he did not think 
that it contained the sort of practical moral guidance necessary for govern- 
ing individuals and society. Instead, he proposed that to solve most moral 
problems, God gave men and women a moral sense and reason to provide 
knowledge of the natural law. 
Wilson borrowed from both Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid when 
he argued that all men and women have a sixth sense whereby they 
intuitively know the difference between right, and wrong.” As evidence for 
the moral sense, Wilson pointed to the ability of children to distinguish 
between good and bad actions, even though their ability to reason is not 
well developed. He also made an anthropological argument, referring to 
the fact that every culture and language has similar notions ofvalue. Wilson 
admitted that he could not “prove” the existence of a moral sense. It is 
something all individuals simply “feel.” He explained that: 
The science of morals, as well as other sciences, is founded on truths, 
that cannot be discovered or proved by reasoning. Reason is con- 
fined to the investigation of unknown truths by the means of such as 
are known. We cannot, therefore, begin to reason, till we are 
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furnished, otherwise than by reason, with some truths, on which we 
can found our arguments (McCloskey 1967, 133). 
The moral sense provides knowledge of the basic principles of natural 
law. Usually this knowledge is sufficient to solve moral problems, but hard 
cases occasionally arise. Wilson, quoting Reid, taught that: 
Moral truths may be divided into two classes; such as are selfevident, 
and such as, from the selfevident ones, are deduced by reasoning. If 
the first be not discerned without reasoning, reasoning can never 
discern the last. The cases that require reasoning are few, compared 
with those that require none; and a man may be very honest and 
virtuous, who cannot reason, and who knows not what demonstration 
means (McCloskey 1967, 136).12 
Most moral problems, then, may be solved by following the dictates of 
one’s moral sense. Moral dilemmas that require individuals to reason from 
intuitive first principles to the appropriate conclusion are rare. Unfortu- 
nately, Wilson did not explore the distinction between these two types of 
moral problems, or even give examples of each kind. Perhaps he did not 
think this was necessary since almost every moral problem may be solved 
through the moral sense alone (McCloskey 1967). 
Wilson acknowledged that there is an important difference between 
knowing and doing good. Although all people possess a moral sense, not 
all choose to follow it. This is because men and women have free wills. 
Individuals may be led by their self-interest, passions, or prejudices to 
ignore their moral impulses and do what they know is wrong. If they do so 
over a long period oftime, their moral senses may become dull. In a similar 
manner, if a society has bad laws, which are contrary to natural law, the 
moral senses of its citizens may be corrupted (McCloskey 1967). 
Yet Wilson clearly thought that most people know and follow correct 
moral principles. In this respect he rejected the Hobbesian notion that men 
are excessively self-interested. He also challenged the liberal mechanistic 
view ofthe formation of society when he proposed that humans are naturally 
sociable. He explained that “the Author of our existence intended us to be 
social beings; and has, for that end, given us social intellectual powers” 
(McCloskey 1967, 230). As such, men and women naturally form and 
perpetuate societies. Further, within these societies they usually act in a 
moral manner. “Even the most consummate liar,” he pointed out, “de- 
clares truths much more frequently than falsehoods” (McCloskey 1967, 
Wilson’s relatively positive view of human nature and society is not 
surprising given his adherence to Scottish moral sense theory. Although 
395). 
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the Scottish thinkers were not in total agreement on the subject, most of 
them shared Wilson’s optimistic views (Bryson 1945; Schneider 1967). 
Yet even if men and women are not predominantly self-interested, it does 
not follow that they are not in need of training. To this end, as Beer (1  993), 
Conrad (1 989 ,  Nedelsky (1990) have demonstrated, Wilson supported a 
subtle form of civic ed~cati0n.l~ He believed that properly designed 
democratic institutions would help bring the people together and encourage 
them to be patriotic. Through their participation in the new republic’s 
government, he was confident that America would become a “progressive 
state, moving on towards perfection” (McCloskey 1967, 84). 
Wilson’s rejection ofthe liberal view of human nature and the formation 
of society has led some to suggest that he was strongly influenced by the 
classical republican tradition (Sellers 1994; Pascal 1991). There is a good 
deal of truth in this claim as it applies to his understanding of civic 
education, but ultimately this tradition alone cannot explain his political 
theory. It is more accurate to say that he borrowed some classical ideas to 
help create a state where natural rights can best be protected. Although he 
defended these rights by appealing to natural law, his understanding ofthem 
was relatively modern and his views regarding who could be citizens 
encompassed far more people than most classical republicans would allow. 
In the final analysis Wilson had an optimistic, but not utopian, view of 
human nature. He thought that individuals are naturally sociable and that 
they usually act in a moral manner. Through education and participation 
in democratic institutions they can become better citizens. But Wilson was 
enough of a realist to recognize that humans are occasionally “seduced, by 
our passions and by our prejudices” (McCloskey 1967,291). Hence he saw 
the necessity for government and laws. 
WILSON’S SOLUTION 
When Wilson coupled his optimistic view of human nature with his 
moral sense theory, he arrived at a solution to the so-called Madisonian 
dilemma. Because of his moral epistemology, he thought that most moral 
problems could be solved by individuals through the use of their moral 
sense. Since everyone possesses this sense equally, it follows that whatever 
most people think is morally correct is, indeed, correct. Thus the surest way 
to know moral truth is to look at the opinions ofthe people, not philosophers, 
theologians, or other “experts” (McCloskey 1 967).14 
Wilson taught that the best way to make laws in agreement with natural 
law is to make them according to the will of the people. “Happily,” he 
remarked, “the general and most important principles of law are not 
removed to a very great distance from common apprehension” (McCloskey 
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1967,72). Majorities in a democracy can generally be trusted to enact fair 
laws. Theoretically, since there is only one moral truth, and because all 
men and women may know it, majority opinion should always be unani- 
mous. Wilson recognized, however, that this is seldom the case. On any 
given issue some people will be led astray by their own interests, or will be 
unable to reason to correct conclusions. Also, lack of knowledge about a 
situation might result in men and women reaching different conclusions. 
In these circumstances, “the voice of the majority must still be deemed the 
will of the whole” (McCloskey 1967,242). The only other option, Wilson 
explained, is to adopt a minority’s opinion. This would be unfair and, more 
important, probably wrong. 
Following the will of the majority “is most reasonable; because it is not 
so probable, that a greater number, as that a smaller number concurring in 
judgement, should be mistaken’’ (McCloskey 1967, 243). Thus majority 
rule is not an end in itself. Rather, majorities govern because they are more 
likely than minorities to legislate according to the natural law. The latter 
must abide by the decisions of the former because of their original consent 
to a democratic form of government (McCloskey 1967). 
Wilson was led by his understanding of moral sense philosophy and his 
faith in human nature to embrace majority rule. Through the collective 
judgement of the people, utilizing their moral sense and reason, natural law 
can be known and translated into positive law. It must be emphasized that 
Wilson supported democracy because it is the best way to know natural law, 
not as an end in itself. Through democratic institutions it is possible to 
create a system of law which “rests its authority, ultimately, upon the 
authority of that law which is divine” (McCloskey 1967, 124). 
In some respects, Wilson’s solution may leave one longing for, in 
Samuel Beer’s words, “not only astringency of Madison’s style but the 
skepticism of his psychology” (1993, 368). Yet Wilson was not simply a 
philosopher who could stop reasoning when he reached an ideal conclusion. 
He was also a politician who recognized the reality that individuals and 
majorities do not always act morally. Undaunted by this fact, he carefully 
expanded his theory to take this reality into account. 
COUNTER-MAJORITAMAN CHECKS 
Although Wilson was generally optimistic about the nature of persons, 
he realized that humans are “frail and imperfect” (McCloskey 1967,278). 
Men and women may act immorally in the pursuit of their own interests. 
Even majorities might occasionally violate natural law if their passions 
overrule their moral senses or, though these cases are rare, they are unable 
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to reason to appropriate conclusions. It was in these sorts of circumstances 
that tyranny could arise in the United States. 
Wilson feared two types of tyranny. The first was that of a few corrupt 
legislators conspiring to deprive the people of their rights and liberties. To 
prevent this, Wilson supported a variety of measures that made it extremely 
difficult to form such a cabal. These included the separation of powers and 
checks and balances between the branches of the national government. 
Perhaps more significant, the direct involvement of the people in regularly 
selecting almost every member of government would prevent corruption 
and minority tyranny (Farrand 1966; McCloskey 1967).15 
More important for the purposes of this essay, however, was Wilson’s 
fear of majority tyranny. He admitted that the masses occasionally act on 
the basis of “self-interest,” “passions,” and/or “prejudices” or they “be- 
come inflamed by mutual imitation and example” (McCloskey 1967,291). 
In these cases they may support dangerous or immoral laws. To restrain 
the excesses of the majority, and its influence on their elected repre- 
sentatives, Wilson supported several important checks aimed at restricting 
the power of the people and those representatives most immediately ac- 
countable to them. For instance, although he advocated the direct election 
of senators, Wilson believed that they should have much longer terms than 
representatives so that they would not be as immediately accountable to the 
people. In this manner the Senate should serve as a check on hasty action 
by the House of Representatives. For similar reasons Wilson also supported 
the creation of a Council of Revision and an executive veto (Farrand 1966). 
The most significant counter-majoritarian check that Wilson supported 
was that of judicial review of both state and congressional legislation 
(Farrand 1966). He believed that it is an important form of institutional 
protection for the Supreme Court, and that it is a means of protecting the 
rights of the people. In his law lectures, Wilson explained that legislation 
might be vetoed by the executive and that it is 
subject also to another given degree of control by the judiciary 
department, whenever the laws, though in fact passed, are found to 
be contradictory to the constitution (McCloskey 1967,300). 
The Supreme Court is in a particularly good position to check Congress 
because justices would be well trained in complex legal matters and would 
be somewhat insulated from popular passions (McCloskey 1967; Farrand 
1966). If laws contradict the Constitution, the Court may prevent their 
enforcement. Wilson showed that he was serious in this regard when he 
led two other judges in refusing to comply with an unconstitutional order 
of Congress.16 
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Although the concept ofjudicial review of congressional legislation was 
not widely supported, Wilson also advocated the more controversial idea 
that legislature is bound by something besides the Constitution. In his law 
lectures he compared the United States to England, noting that English 
courts have the ability to declare acts of Parliament void if they contradict 
natural law. He then wrote that in the United States “the legislative 
authority is subjected to another, beside that arising from natural and 
revealed law; it is subjected to the control arising from the constitution” 
(McCloskey 1967,329 [emphasis added]).17 Thus Wilson was prepared to 
invest the Court with a good deal of power to check the will of the people, 
as manifested through their representatives, on the basis of unwritten natural 
law. 
Wilson’s support of counter-majoritarian institutions and practices 
seems to repudiate his democratic theory. If democracy is the best way to 
make positive law in agreement with natural law, why is it ever necessary 
to check the will of the people? To understand why Wilson was not 
inconsistent in this regard, it is first important to recognize that most of his 
so-called counter-majoritarian checks are actually fairly democratic. For 
instance, both senators and the president are ultimately accountable to the 
people-they are simply less immediately accountable than repre- 
sentatives. Further, he was confident that these and other counter-majori- 
tarian checks would not be used very often. Regarding judicial review, for 
instance, he wrote that “[lfaws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be 
dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to 
justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect” (Farrand 1966, II:73). 
He also argued for judicial self-restraint, noting that a “prudent and cautious 
judge” will “remember, that his duty and his business is, not to make the 
law, but to interpret and apply it” (McCloskey 1967, 502). 
Wilson did not seriously consider the possibility that the Court would 
use its powers to thwart the majority on many issues. He believed it would 
use its power ofjudicial review only rarely, and then to strike down blatantly 
unconstitutional or unjust laws. Thus counter-majoritarian checks like the 
Senate, the executive veto, and judicial review are best viewed as temporary 
injunctions for preventing majorities from acting out of “passions” and 
“prejudices” that are “inflamed by mutual imitation and example” 
(McCloskey 1967,291). In the final analysis they cannot prevent the people 
from passing a law or constitutional amendment, but this is as it should be 
since the people are best able to create laws in agreement with natural law. 
Further, through education and participation in democratic institutions the 
people will eventually progress to the point where majorities can always be 
trusted and checks and balances will no longer be needed (McCloskey 
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1967). Until that day, however, Wilson was realistic enough to see their 
utility. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate that Wilson’s approach to the so-called Madisonian 
dilemma has received little attention. The dilemma was more extreme for 
Wilson than Madison insofar as he had a “stronger” theory of natural rights 
and was more democratic than the latter. Yet, in a sense, the Madisonian 
dilemma was not a dilemma for Wilson, since one of the two ends took 
priority over the other. He did not support majority rule as an end in itself, 
but merely as a means to protect minority rights 
In the final analysis, it is tempting to criticize Wilson for having too 
optimistic a view of human nature. Certainly many contemporary political 
scientists are likely to prefer Madison’s more practical solutions. Yet 
Wilson’s formulation of and solution to the Madisonian dilemma is worthy 
of consideration if one agrees with his claim that the primary purpose of 
government is to protect natural rights. If this is true, then Wilson’s 
approach has merit insofar as he consciously addressed the problem of 
creating political institutions capable of knowing and protecting these 
rights. 
Although Wilson and Madison differed in their understanding of the 
Madisonian dilemma, in practice they supported very similar institutions 
of government at the Constitutional Convention. Their primary difference 
was that Wilson more readily supported thoroughly democratic institutions 
such as the direct, popular, and proportionate election of representatives, 
senators, and even the president. Since 1789, the Constitution has been 
changed by amendments, court cases, and political practice to recognize 
these ideals. As the Constitution has become more democratic, most 
reasonable political scientists and historians would agree that America has 
done a better job of protecting the rights of minorities. Although this 
protection has sometimes apparently been expanded in spite of majority 
opinion, it has always occurred within the constitutional framework envi- 
sioned by Wilson. 
If Wilson’s practical solutions to the perennial problem of modern 
democracy have been successful, it is only reasonable to carefully examine 
the political theory which led him to embrace these solutions. In doing so 
political scientists can learn more about the founding era, and they can better 
understand America’s current constitutional system. Further, if Wilson’s 
theory is correct, it may be possible to use his principles to help create new 
democracies dedicated to the protection of the “natural rights of its mem- 
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bers,” which is, after all, “the primary and the principle object in the 
institution of government” (McCloskey 1967, 592). 
NOTES 
I extend my appreciation to the following people for reading and 
commenting on this work at different times: George Klosko, Henry Abra- 
ham, David O’Brien, David Schultz, George Cary, Garrett Sheldon, Wil- 
liam McClure, and especially to my wife Miriam. I am also grateful to the 
Bradley Foundation for providing financial support for this project. 
‘There have been several fine studies on various aspects of Wilson’s 
thought, but given his importance it is fair to say that he has been relatively 
ignored by the general scholarly community. The bibliography includes 
the most important published studies of Wilson’s political theory. For 
discussion of the Madisonian dilemma see especially Dahl(l956); Bickel 
(1 962). 
2Scholars who ignore Wilson’s theistic natural law theory include Hills 
( 1  989)’ Conrad ( 1  985, 1988), Nedelsky ( 1990), and Horowitz (1 977). 
Tompare Wilson’s classification of law with Hooker (1 888) and Aqui- 
nas (1945). Also see Obering (1938) and O’Donnell(l937). 
4For an example of someone who uses these distinctions carefully see 
Strauss (1950). 
5Wilson did not support the addition of a bill of rights to the Constitution 
because he believed such a document would limit, rather than protect, the 
rights of men and women. On this issue see McMaster and Stone (1970). 
Arkes (1990) contends that Wilson’s argument has merit. 
Jt is true, as Shain (1994) points out, that Wilson, like most founders, 
would have rejected the excessively individualistic view of rights held by 
many modern Americans. Yet Wilson’s view of rights was clearly more 
liberal and less communal than Shain believes. Also see McCloskey 
( 1967). 
6For a good discussion of Wilson’s theory of sovereignty in relation to 
federalism see Beer (1992) and Dennison (1 977). 
’It should be noted that Wilson opposed the institution of slavery and 
apparently favored the right of freed slaves to vote (McCloskey 1967). 
%ome of Wilson’s contemporaries argued that he was not democratic 
enough. Chief among the evidence they cited was his opposition to the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. His objections, however, stemmed 
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from his belief that the institutions created by this document were flawed. 
While he was concerned with majority tyranny, he was not against the 
creation of democratic institutions. The connection between popular sov- 
ereignty and the creation of good laws is discussed below. 
90n Wilson's contributions to the creation of the presidency see espe- 
cially DiClerico (1987) and McCarthy (1 987). 
'OFor instance, Wilson opposed all proposed restrictions on who could 
hold office, including those based on age, country of origin, length of 
residence, and length of time in office (Farrand 1966). 
"Unlike some moral sense theorists, such as David Hume or Adam 
Smith, Wilson contended that the moral sense gives knowledge of the 
natural law. Scottish moral sense theory can be traced back to the Earl of 
Shaftesbury. For further discussion see MacIntyre (1988), Hutcheson 
(1969), Reid ([I7851 1827, [ 17641 1970), and Stimson (1990). 
'*Wilson borrowed this passage from Thomas Reid (1  827, 353-55) 
without citation. 
13The above noted literature provides a good discussion of the impor- 
tance of democratic participation and community in Wilson's thought, but 
the authors neglect the significance of his natural law claims. As a result 
they have difficulty explaining Wilson's counter-majoritarian checks. I 
discuss these issues in the last two sections of this essay. 
I4Wood (1991) emphasizes the relationship between moral sense theory 
and democratic equality. 
I5One of the most important reasons Wilson opposed the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 was that it did not contain separated powers or checks 
and balances that he believed necessary to prevent corruption. Nedelsky 
(1990) proposes that Wilson's support for checks and balances was aimed 
solely at tyranny by governing officials. 
'6Huyburn's Case (1  792). For further discussion see Farrand (1907-08). 
"This passage is ignored by most recent discussions of Wilson's demo- 
cratic theory. See, for instance, Nedelsky (1990), Conrad ( I  9 8 9 ,  Beer 
(1993), and Hills (1989). 
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